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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Petitioner Robert Stiver contests a decision by the Bureau 
of Prisons (the "Bureau") denying him a one-year sentence 
reduction because of his previous convictions for violent 
offenses. Under the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act, "prisoners convicted of a nonviolent 
offense" are eligible for a one-year sentence reduction upon 
successful completion of a drug treatment program. See 18 
U.S.C. S 3621(e)(2)(B).1 Stiver has been incarcerated since 
1992 for possession of heroin with intent to distribute, a 
nonviolent offense. Because he has successfully completed 
a drug treatment program during this prison term, Stiver 
contends he is eligible for early release under the statute. 
Nonetheless, the Bureau denied him a sentence reduction 
pursuant to its regulation that categorically excludes 
inmates previously convicted of a violent crime from 
eligibility for early release under section 3621(e)(2)(B). See 
28 C.F.R. S 550.58.2 Stiver previously was convicted of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 18 U.S.C. S 3621(e)(2)(B) states 
 
       Period of custody.--The period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent 
       offense remains in custody after successfully completing a 
treatment 
       program may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such 
       reduction may not be more than one year from the term the prisoner 
       must otherwise serve. 
 
2. 28 C.F.R. S 550.58 provides in relevant part: 
 
       Except as provided in this paragraph, an inmate . . . who completes 
       a residential drug abuse treatment program including subsequent 
       transitional services in a community-based program (i.e., in a 
 




robbery and aggravated assault, both of which are violent 
offenses. 
 
Stiver sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 2241, alleging that the Bureau's regulation 
conflicts with the enabling statute, 18 U.S.C. 
S 3621(e)(2)(B). He further alleged that the Bureau's 
regulation, 28 C.F.R. S 550.58, violates the double jeopardy 
and ex post facto clauses of the United States Constitution. 
The district court denied habeas corpus relief with regard to 
each of Stiver's claims, and this appeal followed. 
 
The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 2241.3 Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. 




Stiver contends that 18 U.S.C. S 3621(e)(2)(B) allows the 
Bureau to consider only the offense for which an inmate is 
presently incarcerated when deciding whether to grant a 
sentence reduction. Thus, he argues, 28 U.S.C. S 550.58 
represents an impermissible expansion of the authority 
Congress delegated to the Bureau. We review this question 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Community Corrections Center or on home confinement) during his 
       or her current commitment may be eligible, in accordance with 
       paragraph (a) of this section, for early release by a period not to 
       exceed 12 months. The following categories of inmates are not 
       eligible: INS detainees, pretrial inmates, contractual boarders 
(for 
       example, D.C., State, or military inmates), inmates whose current 
       offense is determined to be a crime of violence as defined in 18 
       U.S.C. S 924(c)(3), inmates who have a prior conviction for 
homicide, 
       forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated assault, and inmates who are 
       not eligible for participation in a community-based program as 
       determined by the Warden on the basis of his or her professional 
       discretion. 
 
3. Under 28 U.S.C. S 2241(a), "[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted 
by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any 
circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.. . ." 
 
4. "The courts of appeals . . . have jurisdiction of appeals from all 
final 
decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . ." 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 




of statutory interpretation de novo. See Barden v. Keohane, 
921 F.2d 476, 479 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
When examining an agency's construction of the statute 
it administers, we must first inquire "whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If Congress has directly addressed 
the issue and the legislative intent is unambiguous, our 
inquiry must cease. See id. 
 
The contested statute provides that 
 
       [t]he period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense 
       remains in custody after successfully completing a 
       treatment program may be reduced by the Bureau of 
       Prisons, but such reduction may not be more than one 
       year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3621(e)(2)(B). Despite Stiver's contention to the 
contrary, it is clear that section 3621(e)(2)(B) does not 
indicate whether "convicted of a nonviolent offense" refers 
to all convictions or only the most recent one, for which the 
inmate presently is incarcerated. Instead, its language 
grants the Bureau broad discretion to approve or deny a 
sentence reduction. In other words, section 3621(e)(2)(B) is 
silent on the issue of whether the Bureau may consider 
relevant the violent status of a prisoner's past convictions 
in deciding whether the prisoner is eligible for early release. 
When a statute expressly leaves a gap for an agency to fill 
with its rulemaking authority, the agency's regulations 
must receive "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 844. If, as here, the gap is merely implicit, we 
nonetheless must uphold the agency's construction if it 
has chosen " `a reasonable accommodation of conflicting 
policies that were committed to the agency's care by the 
statute . . . .' " Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 
367 U.S. 374 (1961)). The Bureau, in the exercise of its 
discretion, codified 28 C.F.R. S 550.58, expressing a policy 
determination that inmates who have committed certain 
 




enumerated violent offenses in the past, will not be eligible 
for early release.5 
 
We find that the Bureau's interpretation of the statute 
represents a reasonable accommodation of Congress's goals 
of providing an incentive for inmates to obtain drug 
treatment while at the same time ensuring that persons 
likely to commit violent crimes do not receive early release. 
See H. Rep. No. 103-320, at 2 (1993) (describing purposes 
of statute). The Bureau, in the exercise of its discretion in 
administering the early release element of the residential 
drug abuse treatment program, has imposed an additional 
qualification: prisoners' non-conviction of certain 
enumerated past violent offenses, in addition to the 
requirement that the present conviction be for a non-violent 
offense. It was not attempting to, and has not interpreted 
the phrase "convicted for a violent offense" in a manner at 
odds with Congress's intended meaning, as Stiver suggests. 
 
Stiver contends that this conclusion conflicts with our 
recent decision in Roussos v. Menifee, No. 97-7011, 1997 
WL 401319 (3d Cir. July 18, 1997). Roussos held that a 
Bureau program statement may not define the words 
"nonviolent offense" in section 3621(e)(2)(B) to include 
offenses for which a sentencing court imposes a two-level 
firearms enhancement. We held that since section 
3621(e)(2)(B)'s unambiguous language permits 
consideration only of a crime's defining elements when 
deciding whether that crime is a violent offense, the 
Bureau's reliance on additional factors (i.e., the firearms 
enhancement) violated the statute. 
 
Our holding in Roussos does not control this appeal. 
First, Roussos required us to interpret a different part of 
section 3621(e)(2)(B), addressing the significance of 
"nonviolent offense" rather than "convicted." More 
importantly, Roussos involved only a challenge to a Bureau 
program statement; Stiver, on the other hand, asks us to 
strike down a regulation. As we noted in Koray v. Sizer, 21 
F.3d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds sub 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Bureau enumerated four such offenses: homicide, forcible rape, 
robbery and aggravated assault. 28 C.F.R. S 550.58. Stiver was 
previously convicted of robbery and aggravated assault. 
 




nom. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995), program 
statements are entitled to considerably less deference than 
published regulations because program statements are 
"merely internal agency guidelines [that] may be altered by 
the Bureau at will." See also Roussos, 1997 WL 401319, at 
*5 (noting that program statements receive only "some 
deference," rather than the greater deference accorded 
regulations under Chevron). By contrast, the regulation at 
issue here underwent extensive public notice and comment 
before it was adopted and can only be altered by the Board 
after an equally elaborate process. See Jacks v. Crabtree, 
114 F.3d 983, 984, 985 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, our 
decision in Roussos rested in part on the fact that the 
contested program statement conflicted not only with 
section 3621(e)(2)(B), but with the Bureau's own regulations 
as well. Roussos, 1997 WL 401319, at *4 ("[T]he [Bureau] 
converted a nonviolent crime into a violent one by means of 
a Program Statement that is inconsistent with the language 
of the statute, and its own regulations."). Thus Roussos is 




Stiver also contends that applying the Bureau regulation 
to his case violates the ex post facto clause of the United 
States Constitution. This argument is without merit. We 
have held that two conditions must be met for a law to be 
ex post facto. "First, the law must be retrospective, that is, 
it must apply to events occurring before its enactment. 
Second, the change in the law must alter the definition of 
criminal conduct or increase the penalty by which a crime 
is punishable." United States v. Dozier, 119 F.3d 239, 241 
(3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Stiver suffers no 
disadvantage as a result of the regulation. His sentence 
began in 1992, before section 3621(e)(2)(B) was enacted. At 
that time he could not have been eligible for a one-year 
sentence reduction for completing a substance abuse 
program, because the enabling statute did not yet exist. 
Today, under 28 C.F.R. S 550.58, he is still ineligible for the 
sentence reduction. The fact that he arguably was eligible 
for early release during the brief period between the 
enactment of section 3621(e)(2)(B) and the Bureau's 
adoption of 28 C.F.R. S 550.58 is irrelevant. 
 




The purpose of the prohibition against ex post facto laws 
is to assure that legislative acts "give fair warning of their 
effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until 
explicitly changed." Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29. "Critical to 
relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual's 
right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and 
governmental restraint when the legislature increases 
punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime 
was consummated." Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31. In Stiver's 
case there can be no violation of the ex post facto clause 
because the legal consequences of his crime of heroin 





We must also reject Stiver's argument that 28 C.F.R. 
S 550.58 violates the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy 
clause. The double jeopardy clause "protects against three 
distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same 
offense." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989). 
Stiver invokes the last of these protections in challenging 
the regulation. This argument is misguided. Stiver's 
ineligibility for early release under 28 C.F.R.S 550.58 does 
not subject him to multiple punishments for a single 
offense, because, as noted above, his sentence has not 
increased beyond that originally imposed. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's decision in its entirety. 
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